The Blue Pacific Chessboard
The Pacific Ocean encompasses nearly one-third of the Earth's surface, interspersed with island nations that exercise sovereign control over large maritime territories. Among these, our Pacific Island Countries (PICs), who find themselves shaping a maritime governance landscape increasingly molded by competing powers deploying varied approaches to establish influence. With maritime jurisdictions often hundreds of times larger than their terrestrial domains, PICs occupy a position of heightened international interest for their strategic location but also for their abundant marine resources.
"Regional powers also adapt their approaches"
Regional Players and Their Maritime Strategies
Japan's approach to maritime governance in the Pacific embodies its strategic commitment to maintaining regional security. As Dr. Yurika Ishii from the National Defense Academy of Japan elucidates, Japan concentrates on capacity-building and technical support through financial assistance, training programs, and infrastructure development. The Japan Coast Guard administers comprehensive training for PIC maritime law enforcement agencies and has furnished patrol vessels to fortify operational capabilities in PICs such as Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia and neighboring Palau. Through alliances with organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Japan allocates substantial financial resources to bolster maritime crime control measures.
Japan's approach to maritime governance in the Pacific embodies its strategic commitment to maintaining regional security. As Dr. Yurika Ishii from the National Defense Academy of Japan elucidates, Japan concentrates on capacity-building and technical support through financial assistance, training programs, and infrastructure development. The Japan Coast Guard administers comprehensive training for PIC maritime law enforcement agencies and has furnished patrol vessels to fortify operational capabilities in PICs such as Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia and neighboring Palau. Through alliances with organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Japan allocates substantial financial resources to bolster maritime crime control measures.
Aotearoa maintains distinct interests in the region's maritime safety and security. Bearing responsibility for one of the world's most extensive search and rescue zones (8,746,600 square nautical miles), the land of the long white cloud upholds special security and defense obligations regarding independent states in free association: Niuē and Cook Islands, as well as Tokelau, a non-self-governing country. Aotearoa capitalizes on small government adaptability to customize support to each state's maritime requisites while employing cultural literacy and people-to-people connections as strategic assets.
Recent immigration reforms announced by New Zealand's Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters and Immigration Minister Erica Stanford further bolster New Zealand's commitment to strengthening Pacific relationships. From July 2025, people from all Pacific Islands Forum countries applying for visitor visas will be eligible for multi-entry visas valid for 24 months instead of the current 12. Additionally, from November 2025, Pacific Islands Forum country passport holders traveling from Australia with valid Australian visas will be able to enter New Zealand with just an NZeTA rather than a separate visa for stays up to three months. These measures aim to increase connections between Aotearoa and its Pacific neighbors while maintaining a stable immigration system.
The United Kingdom, a major former colonial power in the region now only left with Hiti-Au-Revareva (Pitcairn Island in Tahitian language), is orchestrating a diplomatic resurgence through its "Pacific Uplift" policy. This initiative has augmented regional diplomatic posts and enhanced existing ones, such as incorporating a defense section in Fiji. Nevertheless, the UK confronts considerable capability constraints with merely two Offshore Patrol Vessels in the region and dependence on Aotearoa for maritime aerial surveillance. In a nutshell, the UK must operate on a shoestring compared to other powers in the region.
The United States directs its focus toward defense and security cooperation, predominantly through COFA (Compact of Free Association agreements with the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands), in which our company provide translation services for these communities in Marshallese, Palauan, Chuukese, Yapese, Kosraean and Pohnpeian. US Navy and Coast Guard assets deliver maritime domain awareness, search and rescue, law enforcement, and counter-transnational crime operations. Shiprider agreements with 12 Pacific Island countries allow local law enforcement officers to board US vessels to implement laws within their respective waters.
China's maritime governance approach aspires to elevate its standing among regional SIDS (Small Island Developing States) such as the Kiribati and the Solomon Islands, while reconfiguring the international maritime order to correspond with PRC interests. In fact, Beijing maintains diplomatic missions in nine PICs and has instituted a series of multilateral dialogues, including the China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers' Meeting. Infrastructure projects financed through China's Belt and Road Initiative could augment PICs' capacity to enforce laws within their exclusive economic zones. Although some projects are connected to the ocean (Port building, bridge reconstruction, etc.) numerous regional BRI projects however remain predominantly land-oriented.
Combating Maritime Challenges
Maritime security in the Pacific confronts multifarious challenges, from illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing to narcotics trafficking and human trafficking. The Pacific's expansive maritime domains and constrained enforcement capacity render it particularly susceptible to these illicit activities.
Japan provides maritime surveillance technology, encompassing radar systems, satellite monitoring, and information-sharing mechanisms, while leveraging its maritime law enforcement expertise to furnish training programs and technical support. Since 2023, Japan has implemented Official Security Assistance designed to address developing countries' security requirements, supplying patrol vessels and related equipment to PICs.
Maritime security in the Pacific confronts multifarious challenges, from illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing to narcotics trafficking and human trafficking. The Pacific's expansive maritime domains and constrained enforcement capacity render it particularly susceptible to these illicit activities.
Japan provides maritime surveillance technology, encompassing radar systems, satellite monitoring, and information-sharing mechanisms, while leveraging its maritime law enforcement expertise to furnish training programs and technical support. Since 2023, Japan has implemented Official Security Assistance designed to address developing countries' security requirements, supplying patrol vessels and related equipment to PICs.
The United States, for their part, enhances maritime domain awareness through the Quad's Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness initiative that allocates substantial budget in advanced technology to Pacific nations (think Starlink, SeaVision, Synthetic Aperture Radar, etc). US Coast Guard vessels operate from Hawaiʻi and Guam to intervene swiftly against illegal activities in the region. Behind the scenes, US officials work tirelessly to help Pacific nations learn the ropes of maritime domain awareness.
Now, Aotearoa functions as a member and principal funder of regional law enforcement organizations, including the Pacific Transnational Crime Network and the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police, to whom we also provide language services. In 2019, the multi-agency New Zealand Transnational Crime Unit was established to cultivate investigative and intelligence capabilities to combat transnational crime in the Pacific.
China has initiated multilateral endeavors concerning marine resource management and maritime domain awareness. The Guangzhou Consensus adopted in 2021 at the First China-PICs Forum on Fisheries Cooperation and Development pledges to combat IUU fishing and investigate establishing a modern fishery cooperation and exchange center.
Geopolitical Tensions and Responses
Pacific Island leaders witness an intensifying strategic competition, endeavoring to preserve neutrality by being friends to all and enemies to none, so to speak. This geopolitical rivalry situates PICs in somewhat precarious positions as they strive to avoid allegiance while maximizing benefits from all partners. In the same boat as many smaller nations caught between major powers, including France, PICs must carefully navigate these diplomatic waters.
China's economic and diplomatic initiatives have amplified its influence in the region, which generate competition for resources and complicate other powers' efforts to secure enduring cooperation with PICs. Beijing's inadequate record with IUU fishing (classified as the worst global offender in the IUU Fishing Risk Index) elicits concerns among PICs whose economies rely heavily on revenue from tuna fishing licenses although, when we speak of tuna, we mostly mean these two tuna species: Te ati and Te Baewe (Skipjack and Yellow-fin in Gilbertese language).
The UK's diplomatic reorientation emerges in response to expanding Chinese influence and the aspiration for a Global role subsequent to Brexit. While UK foreign policy currently undergoes transition, its approach to Pacific maritime governance is anticipated to persist due to broader UK objectives in the Indo-Pacific.
Japan's diplomatic influence facilitates cooperation and establishes regional support networks. The country assumes a leading role in regional initiatives promoting maritime security, with historical relationships in the North Pacific positioning it as a trusted partner. In infrastructure development, Japan presents itself as a preferred collaborator for quality infrastructure through initiatives such as the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure.
Regional Frameworks and Cooperation
The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) functions as the region's preeminent platform for multilateral cooperation. Its 2050 Strategy on the Blue Pacific Continent considers ocean stewardship fundamental to regional politics, acknowledging PICs as custodians of about 20% of the earth's surface with dep cultural and spiritual value attributed to ocean and land as common heritage.
The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) functions as the region's preeminent platform for multilateral cooperation. Its 2050 Strategy on the Blue Pacific Continent considers ocean stewardship fundamental to regional politics, acknowledging PICs as custodians of about 20% of the earth's surface with dep cultural and spiritual value attributed to ocean and land as common heritage.
New Zealand's recent visa policy changes align with discussions scheduled for the Pacific Islands Forum leaders meeting in Solomon Islands in September 2025. As Foreign Minister Winston Peters noted, these immigration reforms represent a tangible step to increase the connection between Aotearoa and the Pacific. By easing travel restrictions, Aotearoa is strengthening the human connections that underpin broader security and governance cooperation.
Aotearoa contributes financially to regional governance functions, including the Office of the Pacific Ocean Commissioner, the Forum Fisheries Agency, and the Pacific Community's Centre for Ocean Science. The New Zealand Defence Force furnishes aerial and surface surveillance support for multinational FFA IUU fishing operations. This approach allows Aotearoa to think outside the box: Supporting maritime enforcement while strengthening regional relationships.
The United States also collaborates with like-minded partners through the Blue Pacific Initiative to foster resilience, ocean protection, and sustainable development. Annual Pacific Partnership missions deliver essential services, enhance disaster response capabilities (such as with the US hospital ship USNS Mercy), and support anti-transnational crime efforts through capacity-building activities.
Japan actively engages in multilateral frameworks and convened the 10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting in Tokyo in 2024 to facilitate cooperation and information exchange among PICs and regional stakeholders. These meetings ensure all participants are on the same page regarding regional maritime priorities.
Jurisdictional and Capacity Limitations
PICs encounter substantial challenges in maritime governance due to restricted resources and extensive exclusive economic zones. Japan's Coast Guard authority is confined to Japanese maritime jurisdiction, thus circumscribing direct law enforcement activities in international waters. This necessitates coordination with local maritime agencies, which proves challenging given the varying capacity levels.
The UK's presence in the region is characterized by limited resources, ranking 17th among the region's donors according to data from the Lowy Institute. Its Integrated Security Fund allocated less than 1.25% of funds to the Pacific (even when combined with Southeast Asia) from 2020 to 2023. This level of investment simply won't cut it if the UK wishes to become a significant maritime player in the region.
Aotearoa, despite constrained fiscal resources compared to other security partners, harnesses the expertise of its personnel to provide capacity-building, technical regulatory assistance, and legislative counsel. With one of its naval fleet vessels (HMNZS Manawanui) recently sinking in Sāmoa, Aotearoa confronts diminished hydrographic capability and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief response capacity. This setback has forced the country to go back to the drawing board regarding its regional maritime presence. However, Aotearoa's recent moves to streamline immigration for Pacific visitors show its commitment to strengthening regional connections through multiple avenues, not solely through maritime security initiatives.
The United States encounters logistical impediments due to the region's vast geography. Infrastructure limitations, technological deficiencies, and shortages of trained personnel in PICs impede effective utilization of US-provided tools and resources for maritime governance. With so many moving parts in regional maritime governance, coordination remains a perpetual challenge.
The Road Ahead
As maritime governance in the Pacific evolves, PICs will continue to equilibrate relationships with major powers while asserting their sovereignty and addressing pressing concerns like climate change effects, resource management, and transnational crime. The efficacy of external powers' efforts will hinge on their ability to align with regional priorities and respect Pacific Island leadership. For PICs, the ball is in their court to determine how to leverage international interest while maintaining autonomy.
Our company's engagement with Pacific Island languages situates our activities at the critical crossroads of culture and geopolitics. In fact, we directly observe the influence of regional power dynamics on governance structures and the experiences within the Pacific region. Consistent engagement with our islander communities ensures our linguistic analysis accurately reflects the subtleties inherent in maritime policy discourse. Furthermore, the indigenous nature of our work with Pacific Island languages encapsulate the narratives of our peoples addressing the geopolitical challenges and asserting sovereign trajectories amidst heightened international contestation.
The maritime chess game in the Pacific will demand defense and economic might, as well as cultural comprehension and respect for regional autonomy. It's a long shot that any single power will dominate regional maritime governance. And Aotearoa's recent visa reforms exemplify how policy changes beyond traditional security measures can strengthen regional connections and influence. As external powers refine the approach, the voices and priorities of PICs must remain central to any sustainable maritime governance framework.
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