The Pacific Dance: How Nations Court Island States

The United States steps onto the stage declaring itself a "Pacific nation", drawing on its historical presence in the nortern Pacific since the 1800s. But it's not just about history and legacy - it's about style and substance. American diplomats fly in for high-profile summits, promise billions in aid, and speak warmly of "friends and partners." Yet Pacific leaders notice when grand announcements aren't matched by swift action, or when funding gets stuck in Congressional gridlock.

China takes a different approach. Rather than claim to be a Pacific nation outright, Chinese officials weave a narrative of shared experiences and South-South cooperation between developing nations. They speak of colonial histories and present themselves as fellow travelers on the road to development. The Belt and Road Initiative gets prominent billing, with promises of infrastructure projects and economic opportunities.

But Pacific Island nations aren't passive audiences for these diplomatic performances. Take Fiji, for instance. When Australia and other traditional partners tried to isolate Fiji following its 2006 coup, Fijian leaders skillfully used China's friendship to send a message: we have options. They adopted some of China's language about colonial histories and South-South cooperation, not because they were convinced by China's worldview, but because it served their interests in that moment.

Solomon Islands offers another illuminating example. When Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare announced his country's switch in diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 2019, he deliberately echoed some Chinese diplomatic phrases. But he did this while simultaneously leveraging the move to attract more attention and resources from traditional partners like Australia and the United States. The result? A reopened U.S. embassy, increased aid, and heightened diplomatic engagement from multiple powers.

Sāmoa shows yet another variation. Under both former Prime Minister Tuilaʻepa Saʻilele Malielegaoi and current Prime Minister Fiamē Naomi Mataʻafa, Samoan leaders have maintained a proudly independent stance. When China came calling with its Belt and Road Initiative, Sāmoa initially signed up - but later cancelled a major port project over debt concerns. When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited in 2022, Sāmoa signed an agreement with China. But just days later, Sāmoa welcomed Australia's Foreign Minister and secured additional support. It wasn't about choosing sides - it was about maximizing benefits for Sāmoa.

France presents yet another variation in this Pacific courtship, though its presence stirs complex emotions. Through its "overseas territories" of New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and ʻUvea and Futuna, France claims to be naturally "in" the Pacific. French officials frequently emphasize these territorial connections to justify their regional presence. But this narrative hits a raw nerve with many Pacific peoples, particularly in New Caledonia where Kanak independence aspirations remain strong. When French President Emmanuel Macron visited the region in 2023 to denounce China's "new imperialism", some Pacific leaders noted the irony of this message coming from a continuing colonial power. The violent protests that erupted in New Caledonia in early 2024, resulting in several deaths and requiring a 3,000-troop mainland French police deployment, further highlight the tensions underlying France's territorial claims in the Pacific.

What's particularly striking is how Pacific Island countries have developed their own powerful narrative: the "Blue Pacific". Having translated countless documents, ranging from reports for the Pacific Community for Law Enforcement Cooperation program to bulletins for the PICP Women's Advisory Network, we had to convey the Blue Pacific concept, which emphasizes Pacific peoples' deep connection to the ocean and their right to steward its resources. The Blue Pacific concept serves as both a shield and a sword in diplomatic relations. When China proposed a region-wide security agreement in 2022, Pacific leaders used the Blue Pacific framework to deflect it, insisting that such matters must be discussed through proper regional channels.

The language of these interactions reveals much about the underlying dynamics. When the U.S. talks about the region, it often slips into strategic terminology - "Indo-Pacific", "military cooperation", "strategic competition". China emphasizes "development cooperation", "mutual benefit", and "South-South solidarity". But Pacific leaders speak of "climate change", "ocean resources", and "regional sovereignty". These aren't just word choices - they reflect fundamentally different priorities and worldviews.

The diplomatic dance continues to evolve. The U.S. now hosts Pacific leaders at the White House, opens new embassies, sets up the 1st professional exchange program (IVLP) for the Pacific Islands in 2019, and promises increased engagement. China builds stadiums, funds infrastructure, and promotes its Belt and Road Initiative. Other players like Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and India develop their own approaches, including police assistance in the Solomon Islands, consulate services in French Polynesia, etc. But throughout it all, Pacific Island nations maintain their agency, selecting elements from various partners' offerings that align with their national interests.

What's often overlooked in international media coverage is just how sophisticated Pacific diplomacy can be. We aren't small states being pushed around by greater powers - we're savvy actors who understand our strategic importance in today's world. When the Kiribati signs a security agreement with China for security policing and a crime database program, when Fiji calibrates its relationships after a change in government, or when Sāmoa balances multiple international partners, these aren't accidents. They're carefully considered moves by leaders who know exactly what they're doing.

Looking ahead, the success of any outside power in the Pacific is likely to depend less on grand narratives about being a "Pacific nation" or a "developing country partner," and more on demonstrating genuine commitment to Pacific priorities. Climate change, economic development, and regional sovereignty are talking points for Pacific nations but also existential concerns that demand real action.

The story of diplomacy in the Pacific isn't simply about great power competition between the U.S. and China. It's about how Pacific Island countries treat these relationships while advancing their own interests, whether at the Pacific Islands Forum or the United Nations. They react to the narratives of the loudest voices, create and deploy their own. As translators working with Pacific languages know too well, meaning often lies in the verb and in how it is used, by whom, and for what purpose.

In the end, perhaps the most important story isn't being told by any outside power - it's being written by us Pacific Island nations ourselves, in our own words, on our own terms. And that's a narrative worth paying attention to.